Date : 08/04/95
Page : 1

# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
# IDENTIFICATION FORM

## AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10081
RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 10-H-13

## DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : GOODWIN, RICHARD
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 07/10/75
PAGES : 61
SUBJECTS : ASSASSINATION, TRUJILLO

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

CIA

EISENHOWER, DWIGHT

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/12/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 3

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

TOP SECRET

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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R478

# The United States Senate

Goodwin

## Report of Proceedings

INVENTORIED
ON 3/2/77
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Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

7600031326

Thursday, July 10, 1975

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction)


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EXHIBITS



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EXECUTIVE SESSION

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Thursday, July 10, 1975

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United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to

Governmental Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 5:02 o'clock p.m. in Room S-128, The Capitol, the Honorable Frank Church (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan, Mondale, Huddleston, Hart of Colorado, Tower, Baker and Schweiker.

Also present: William Miller, Staff Director; Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel; Charles Kirbow, Charles Lombard, Michael J. Madigan, David Aaron, Joe Dennin, Elizabeth Culbreth and Patrick Shea, Professional Staff Members.

- - -

P R O C E E D I N G S

The Chairman. We will come back into order.

Mr. Goodwin, would you please take the oath?

Do you swear that all the testimony you are about to give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Goodwin. I do.

The Chairman. I am given to understand that there has been some problem in connection with your appearance here today and that there are some notes that you have that you feel you need for purposes of your testimony which you have not brought with you. Is that the case?

Mr. Goodwin. Yes, I think they might be helpful. They have been in storage for several years and I just had no access to them. I have to go get them out of the storage. They were notes -- my files and everything have been in storage for several years. I've had no access to them. And they consist of the files that I brought from the White House with me.

The Chairman. Have you been interviewed by members of the staff and shown certain documents that the staff believes will be pertinent to your testimony?

Mr. Goodwin. I have been shown documents connected with the Dominican Republic and the assassination of Trujillo today.

The Chairman. And do you believe that you are prepared today to give us testimony relating to Mr. Trujillo or do you

believe that you need to or ought to review those notes before you give any testimony?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I'm of course fully prepared to testify to the best of my recollection to any matter, and I think probably in the case of the Dominican Republic, the documents have been adequate. I think there's a good chance that going through the files may very well add something to my recollection of Cuba and Castro.

The Chairman. Well I will have this suggestion to make. We will take your testimony on the Trujillo matter today, and then -- how long will it take you to get your files and review them and come back fully prepared to give us your testimony on the other issues?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, it will take a day or two. It is possible I will not be able to get access to them until Monday morning. It's kind of like trying to get to Pocatello and find them in a warehouse, because I'm up in Rumford, Maine. But I am sure that it would not take more than a day or two.

The Chairman. So that if the Committee were to give you that opportunity, would you then get those files, review them, and respond to the request by the Committee that you appear the first of next week to testify?

Mr. Goodwin. If that is your wish, certainly.

The Chairman. We are most anxious to complete the record and your testimony is necessary, and it would certainly

accomodate our need if you would cooperate.

Mr. Goodwin. I would be glad to.

The Chairman. All right.

With that understanding then, Mr. Schwarz, are you prepared to proceed with the questioning on Trujillo?

Mr. Schwarz. I'm sorry Mr. Goodwin that we didn't have a chance to get together. I thought we were going to have a chance to do that on Tuesday, and I have not had a chance to speak to you but I do know some of the material, and perhaps we can work on the material.

Before we do so, could you state your full name and your address please?

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. GOODWIN

Mr. Goodwin. Richard M. Goodwin, 1536 32nd Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

Mr. Schwarz. And as a matter of course, we tell all of our witnesses what they no doubt know, that they have their right to counsel, and you know that, and if you want to stop to obtain counsel, you know that you can do that?

Mr. Goodwin. I already have too many lawyers.

Mr. Schwarz. And you know what your constitutional rights are?

Mr. Goodwin. Hopefully.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, what connection did you have with the Dominican Republic in the winter and spring of 1961?

Mr. Goodwin. I came into the White House as Assistant Special Counsel to the President, having worked on Latin American affairs policy statements in the preceeding campaign. I became involved in Latin America. And from that period until I left to go to the State Department, I was involved on a daily basis with President Kennedy and his activities in Latin America which included what was happening in the Dominican Republic in terms that I drafted contingency plans, I prepared cables that went to Mr. Dearborn focussing on the areas that you are interested in, and I was with him every day on something connected with Latin America.

Mr. Schwarz. Without your turning to the documentary

material, would you recount for the Committee your understanding of what the United States government policy toward the Dominican Republic was in the winter and spring of '61 and what actions were taken to implement that policy.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, that policy was a continuation of the policy established by President Eisenhower when he, in accordance with the vote of the OAS, voted to sever -- decided to sever diplomatic and commercial relations with the Dominican Republic and the situation which you know arose was precipitated by the attempted assassination of President Betancourt by the President of the Dominican Republic.

So that from that point on when we came in, the feeling was, first of all, of course that Trujillo was even more at odds with the philosophy of the Alliance for Progress than had been and beyond that, having cut off diplomatic and other relations, that Trujillo's time in office was probably numbered. The principal support of the regime in that decade which was often in great domestic difficulty had been the concept of American support, it strengthened Trujillo against his opposition.

At that point our policy became one of trying to anticipate at least, the fall of Trujillo. Of course the Castro thing was very much in everybody's mind and the principal concern of the President, the one thing he didn't want was for Trujillo to go and a Communist leader to come in. So I think the policy

was to keep up our economic and diplomatic pressure to hope that when Trujillo went, however he went, whether violently or peacefully or died a natural death that the succession would be a moderate, democratic group friendly to the interests of the United States in the Caribbean and therefore try to keep in touch with and help out and keep communications open with the potential successor groups, and it was very hard to pinpoint.

Mr. Schwarz. What steps did you take during the period of time you were involved, or prior thereto, if you know about it, in order to assist one or more of the dissident groups?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, we did all sorts -- everything from policy statements, the use of USIA, the use of economic pressure, to maintain our network of contacts with exile groups principally in New York and elsewhere. A certain number of limited covert operations, some transfer of arms. Dearborn of course was one of the principals, his principal instruction was to try to keep all channels of communication open, he was zealous in this because he disliked Trujillo intensely himself and felt that he ought to be allied with these other groups. And I read through the sort of overall planning papers, and I think they fairly reflect that range of operations.

None of them were terribly effective.

Mr. Schwarz. In connection with the transfer of arms,

what, to your understanding, was the time at which authorization was provided to transfer arms?

Mr. Goodwin. January 12, 1960, under President Eisenhower.

Mr. Schwarz. And that was at a meeting of the Special Group?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I don't know because they didn't let me in that week, but there was an NSC action memorandum of some kind which just set forth the authorization. I don't really know the procedure.

Mr. Schwarz. When were the arms passed?

Mr. Goodwin. I don't know. I became aware of the transfer of arms. The transfer I think you're thinking of is the transfer of a couple of carbines and .38 pistols. After the transfer had been made, [illegible] the message of communication that came to us from the Dominican Republic along with the request for the transfer of machine guns which were to be used in an effort to kill Trujillo, the smaller guns were to be given as Dearborn told me later in conversation after the assassination because these people felt their own lives were in danger, especially if they embarked on anything as risky as trying to kill Trujillo, and they wanted some self-defense weapons, and they were given to them for self-defense and then they made a request that they wanted weapons to try an assassination, they wanted a machine gun.

Assassinating Trujillo, of course, a lot of people had

tried and most of them, they were all dead. It was a very risky business. It's not the kind of thing they would want to try with a .38.

And I think also, I mean nobody, I think -- as I say, we had no particular anticipation that this or any other group would be successful in something that nobody had been able to do for thirty years, but at any rate, those were the backstops.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you know how the arms were passed into the Dominican Republic, as opposed to passed to the dissidents?

Mr. Goodwin. No, I only know what Dearborn later told me in conversation. I only have this fifteen year old memory on my part that he gave them to them in the consulate. I may have known at one time how he got them. There were a lot of guns in the Dominican Republic.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you know that arms were passed through the diplomatic pouch?

Mr. Goodwin. I did not know that, but I wouldn't be surprised, weapons of that size.

Mr. Schwarz. Now again, when were the arms passed, as far as you know?

Mr. Goodwin. Well I don't know. I don't have the exact -- the message is in here. I think it was after President Kennedy took office.

My knowledge of it was on the basis of the message --

The Chairman. Is there someone that can help Mr. Goodwin

with the documents?

Mr. Schwarz. Let's mark that as Goodwin Exhibit No. 1, a document consisting -- dated May 13, 1961 and headed Subject, CIA Covert Activities, Dominican Republic, stating: "Attached is the special briefing paper of CIA covert activities directed against the Dominican Republic which is requested by Mr. Richard Goodwin at the White House," and attaching a several page document with that heading and that date.

Mr. Goodwin. This is the paper that they sent me and that's where, I guess, I found out about it.

(The document referred to was marked Goodwin Exhibit No. 1 for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. Now that indicates, does it not, that the weapons were passed sometime after late January, you can tell that?

Mr. Goodwin. Yeah.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

You can tell that by looking at the heading 2 which indicates when the request for the passage of the arms was made.

Mr. Goodwin. Yes, it says in late January. Of course they weren't authorized until the 12th.

Mr. Schwarz. But they were passed, in any event, after the Kennedy Administration took office.

Mr. Goodwin. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Now you told President Johnson, Vice President Johnson,-- we will mark this Goodwin Exhibit 2, a memorandum which, Senators, is at Tab H, the book which is marked book 2 of 2 and dated June 1, 1961.

(The document referred to was marked Goodwin Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. Would you read into the record, Mr. Goodwin, this is a memorandum for the files dated June 1, 1961, subject Report of Point Raised at meeting with Vice President.

Would you read into the record the second paragraph?

Mr. Goodwin. "At one point during the meeting, the Vice President asked about the three carbines which the Agency had turned over to the dissidents, specifically asked about the date of delivery. Mr. Goodwin made a statement to the effect that this was done under the previous Administration, i.e., prior to January 20, 1961, pursuant to a decision of the Special Group."

Can you tell me if this his memo I'm reading? I'd like to know.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, there are some initials at the bottom of the page, do they help you decide whose memo it is?

Mr. Dennin. I believe we were told by Secretary of State Rusk that it's Under Secretary of State Johnson. That's what the U stands for.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you make that statement, Mr. Goodwin?

Mr. Goodwin. I don't remember making it. It is an inaccurate statement, and there was a clear record that it would be inaccurate in documents that I had already seen. I thought that I wouldn't have made it. I had no purpose in making it. And this is --

The Chairman. What is the inaccuracy of this?

Mr. Goodwin. The delivery of the arms was not made prior to January 20th. The authorization, Senator, was prior to January 20th.

Senator Schweiker. Was when, again? Was what date?

Mr. Goodwin. The authorization was the 12th of January.

Senator Schweiker. What year?

Mr. Goodwin. 1961.

Senator Schweiker. And delivery was when?

Mr. Schwarz. Sometime subsequent to January 20th.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, now that I look at this, all it says was late January.

The Chairman. This is June 1st, this is dated June 1st, and you are reported to have said, "At one point during the meeting the Vice President asked about the three carbines which the Agency had turned over to the dissidents and specifically asked about the date of delivery. Mr. Goodwin made the statement to the effect that this was done under the previous Administration, i.e., prior to January 20th, 1961, pursuant to a decision of the Special Group."

Actually the delivery took place after January 20th 1961.

Mr. Goodwin. Well that was my first impression on reading that, but I notice that all it says was late January, Senator, so I suppose the 20th or the 19th in somebody's mind could be late January. I mean, I don't really remember.

Mr. Schwarz. But Mr. Goodwin, you know, independent of

the document which we marked as Exhibit 1, in fact the arms were delivered after January 20th.

Mr. Goodwin. I may have known. All I -- my first knowledge was this document, the timetable that I requested which simply informed me that the delivery of carbines had been made in late January. I don't know any more than that.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

Mr. Goodwin. This is my source of knowledge. I may have learned more subsequent to it if Dearborn pinpointed it.

Mr. Schwarz. In addition with dealing with Dearborn, were you dealing with anybody from the CIA on this?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, they were always at the meetings.

Mr. Schwarz. Who do you remember from the CIA?

Mr. Goodwin. Tracy Barnes -- I can't be sure who all was there. At the meeting with the Vice President, I'm sure somebody like Bissell, at least, would have been there. But I'm sure you must have a list.

Mr. Schwarz. Now I would like you to testify in answer to a series of questions as to what you were or were not told.

Now, were you told that the arms which had been delivered had been delivered to persons who said at times that they wanted to use them for personal defense, but who said more often that they wanted to use them for assassination purposes?

Mr. Goodwin. I was given to understand and told specifically and it's reflected in the documents, that they

wanted -- in order to carry out an assassination, they thought they needed transfer of additional weapons, of submachine guns. I don't remember any indication that anyone thought that a carbine or a .38 was adequate to mount an effort of that kind against Trujillo. But they, of course, were interested in assassinating Trujillo, involved as they were in a very life and death struggle, their families were being slaughtered --

Mr. Schwarz. The record demonstrates that the Agency was informed in April, prior to the memorandum that went to you which we marked as Exhibit 1, that the dissidents intended to undertake the assassination effort and to do so within the means that they eventually actually did, by blockading the road and shooting Mr. Trujillo as he was visiting his mistress. And that they intended to do it whether or not they received the machine guns, but they would like the machine guns, just to help.

Now, were you informed by the Agency or by anyone else that the dissidents intended to accomplish the assassination with the small arms whether or not they got the machines?

Mr. Goodwin. I was informed that both this and other groups intended and wanted to assassinate Trujillo. We got reports of assassinations about to occur almost every two or three weeks in the White House. There is a long gap between wanting to kill Trujillo and being able to do it, and -- but at all times, continually, up into May, there was the very

insistent request for additional arms that would make the plot feasible and at the specific request of President Kennedy, those arms were denied and --

Mr. Schwarz. I'm going to come to that. I want to know what you were informed about the intentions of the dissidents. You didn't answer my question. You said you were frequently informed about assassination plots all over the world, but specifically with respect to the Dominican Republic, were you or were you not informed that the Agency had been told by the dissidents that they intended to accomplish the assassination of Fidel Castro -- excuse me, of Trujillo -- whether or not they received the machine guns?

Mr. Goodwin. I was told that afterwards by Dearborn. I wasn't told that particularly at the time, although that wouldn't surprise me if they said that. By the Agency, you mean Dearborn, or --

Mr. Schwarz. I mean the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Goodwin. They communicated directly with the Agency in this instance?

Mr. Schwarz. There were Agency people in the Republic. Did you know there were Agency people in the Republic?

Mr. Goodwin. I knew they were in and out.

Mr. Schwarz. In and out?

Mr. Goodwin. They ran some guns in at one time, as I remember, and they also were engaged in the collection of

intelligence about dissident groups.

Mr. Schwarz. Was it your impression that Dearborn was in charge of the Dominican Republic, or the Agency personnel was in charge of the Dominican Republic?

Mr. Goodwin. My impression at the time was that the instructions given to Dearborn were carried out, and all instructions from the President went to Dearborn.

Mr. Schwarz. Apart from instructions from the President, was it your impression that the Agency was in charge of the Dominican Republic or that Dearborn was in charge of the Dominican Republic.

Mr. Goodwin. My impression was that Dearborn was in charge of the Dominican Republic, subject to very close supervision from Washington.

The Chairman. Dearborn was the --

Mr. Goodwin. He was the Consul. We had no formal relations.

The Chairman. He was the Consul?

Mr. Goodwin. Right.

Wasn't that true?

Mr. Schwarz. The paper record makes it look quite likely that the Agency, at least from their point of view, thought that they were in charge.

Mr. Goodwin. They should have told the President. We sent all of our messages to Dearborn.

Mr. Schwarz. What was your understanding of the location of the machine guns that the dissidents wanted?

Mr. Goodwin. I don't remember, but it's in here somewhere in the paper.

(Pause)

Mr. Schwarz. Well, let me cut through the question.

Did you know that the machine guns were sent to the Dominican Republic through the diplomatic pouch?

Mr. Goodwin. I know now.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you know about it?

Mr. Goodwin. No. I knew, when the issue arose in May that we had -- we had brought in machine guns, but the precise method by which they were brought in I never asked about.

The Chairman. I am having a little difficulty following.

We began with your being told that it was the policy of the previous Administration to encourage dissident groups and do whatever possible to isolate or to undermine and bring down the Trujillo regime. Then, following the Inauguration of President Kennedy, certain weapons are passed to these dissidents in the Dominican Republic for the purpose of assassinating -- of their use in the assassinating President Trujillo.

Now when did you learn that weapons had been in fact passed to dissident groups, that obviously had occurred after President Kennedy had been inaugurated. When did you first

learn?

Mr. Goodwin. On the 13th of May when we requested from the White House a briefing paper on all covert activities in the Dominican Republic, that had been conducted in the Dominican Republic.

Mr. Schwarz. Now that briefing paper was requested from whom?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, it would have been requested by me for the President.

Mr. Schwarz. From the CIA?

Mr. Goodwin. From the CIA.

The Chairman. From the CIA, and that briefing paper has been identified for the record?

Mr. Goodwin. That is correct.

The Chairman. All right.

When you found out that these weapons had been transferred in January to certain dissident groups for the purpose of assassinating Trujillo, what did you do?

Was it then your understanding that this was President Kennedy's policy?

Mr. Goodwin. No.

The Chairman. Then what did you do when you received that information?

Mr. Goodwin. If I may go back for a moment, Senator, and that is the briefing paper involved a very clear distinction

between these weapons which were to be used for purposes of personal type side-arms, the self-defense attendant to any project and the desire for assassination weapons which would have consisted of machine guns.

Our response to this briefing paper was immediately to try to review our entire policy toward the Dominican Republic and prepare, which we did over the next couple of weeks, instructions to the Consul about the nature of future relations with dissidents, because the President felt that things might be getting out of hand, with what was happening in the Dominican Republic.

So we did prepare that paper. The President had, as I said, two great concerns. He didn't want anybody trying to push Trujillo over unless he knew what was going to happen next, because he would much rather have Trujillo in there than a Communist leader. And secondly, that the United States not be associated with any kind of violent overthrow. And in the telegram that was --

The Chairman. All right.

Now when the President told you that those were his two concerns, what action was then taken to implement the President's policy?

Mr. Goodwin. The action that was then taken was to take and set aside the original instructions from the State Department and at the President's instructions, I typed up the

telegram which is here in my handwriting, which was to go and did go, slightly revised to --

Mr. Schwarz. All right. Let me mark the one in your hand as Exhibit 3.

(The document referred to was marked as Goodwin Exhibit No. 3-A for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. Well, let's mark them, Mr. Goodwin -- you know how to do this as well as I do. Make them 3-A, 3-B and 3-C.

Mr. Goodwin. In which I personally added in the course of rewriting --

The Chairman. Can you identify in the Senators' books where these documents appear?

Mr. Schwarz. Where is 3-A?

Mr. Goodwin. This is 233 at the bottom.

(Pause)

This xerox of my raw, personally typewritten draft appears on page 237. That's my very bad typing and handwriting.

And then page 256 is the final. And the same page, 242, page 237 and 242.

The Chairman. Is 242 the final version of the message that went out?

Mr. Goodwin. Yes.

The Chairman. This is for Dearborn from State?

Mr. Goodwin. That's correct.

The Chairman. And by whom was the messages signed?

Mr. Goodwin. Probably the Secretary, I guess, but they are both my drafts. I received a draft from the State Department, discussed it with the President, and at his instruction prepared this redraft. I never would have overridden the State Department on my own, and adding to it two major points aside

from rewording it. The first one is on a different matter, and the second one was to say in the final version, "However, we must not run the risk of U.S. association with political assassinations, since the United States as a matter of general policy cannot condone assassinations. This last principle is overriding and most prevail in doubtful situations."

That was inserted at the instruction of the President, a much stronger statement of that than occurs in the State Department draft, and it finishes again with -- it says, "Clearly, at the present time we are unable to transfer arms to dissidents. We feel that the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose."

(The document referred to was marked Goodwin Exhibit No. 3-B for identification.)

The Chairman. Now you saw this telegram and approved it before it was sent by State?

Mr. Goodwin. I wrote it.

The Chairman. But you said that the State Department changed the language.

Mr. Goodwin. No. They had prepared an original draft which I changed and redrafted. Now that is here too, including a note from them saying that I wasn't satisfied with their draft.

The Chairman. So this was your own message, then, that you believed accurately reflected President Kennedy's policy?

Mr. Goodwin. It was prepared at the specific instruction of the President. It was shown to him before transmission.

The Chairman. It was shown to the President?

Mr. Goodwin. Oh, yes.

The Chairman. Very well.

Then, reading the first paragraph, "The President has now approved contingency plans discussed during your stay here with one major exception. You are not to request a pre-signed request for help from Dominican dissident groups."

Mr. Goodwin. I can explain that, Senator.

There was a proposal made in the State Department version that has been discussed that the dissident groups, that in case they managed to take over the government and there was some kind of fighting that they should request help from Venezuela,

Columbia, a few of our allies and therefore we ought to prepare them in advance for such a request. The President thought that putting such a document in their hands would amount to a declaration of war and wanted it struck.

The Chairman. All right.

Then the second paragraph, "We consider it essential that you continue to work" -- well, before we go on with the second paragraph, in the first paragraph you say, "The President has now approved contingency plans discussed during your stay here with one major exception."

Now, what were those contingency plans that had been discussed?

Mr. Goodwin. They have them here, I believe. I think -- this is a very thick document, where you have a series of contingency plans, it discusses here. "The paramount interest of the United States is to assure that Castro-Communist elements not take over." It says Trujillo is weak, and then it is an analysis of the dissidents and their intention, the weakness of the Trujillo regime, and it goes into the covert activities, which, I think probably -- is that your principal interest at this time?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Goodwin. There's an Appendix that sets forth all the covert activities. Recommendation A of the United States, not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo, that we inform pro-U.S.

tape 5b

dissidents that if they succeed on their own and form an acceptable government we will be glad to come in and help them and then the rest talks about here; ways of recognizing --

The Chairman. There is nothing in that contingency plan that contemplated the assassination of Trujillo himself?

Mr. Goodwin. It contemplated only the possibility that he might be assassinated, not that we would assassinate him.

The Chairman. But if he were assassinated, it would have presumably been the result of an action by a dissident group to overthrow his regime?

Mr. Goodwin. Yes.

The Chairman. All right.

Moving to Paragraph 2 in your message -- the President's message to Mr. Dearborn, "We consider it essential that you continue to work to strengthen pro-U.S. sentiment among dissident groups. Your work along this line has been invaluable. However, we must not run the risk of U.S. association with political assassination, since the U.S., as a matter of general policy cannot condone assassination. This last principle is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situations."

Now that language, it has been suggested by some members of the Committee that your concern here had to do with avoiding any relationship that might lead to a disclosure that the United States had indeed an interest in or was somehow involved in a plot to assassinate Trujillo. Because you say, "however

we must not run the risk of U.S. association with political assassination, since the U.S. as a matter of general policy cannot condone assassination. This last principle is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situations."

Now don't those words at least convey or lend themselves to the interpretation that your primary concern was that the United States should not get caught?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I don't believe so, Senator, because I think, to me, the plain meaning of the words and as I understood it was that we must not run the risk of U.S. association with political assassination. That means not be associated with the process of political assassination in any form.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman?

In that same vein, if I could interrupt for just a second, is it true -- and would Counsel prompt me -- that the guns had already been dispatched?

Mr. Schwarz. Certain guns.

Senator Baker. I'm not talking about how many, Fritz. Guns had been dispatched.

Mr. Schwarz. But this telegram refuses the passage of four machine guns.

Senator Baker. I'm not going to argue with you. I am just saying that guns had been dispatched.

Senator Schweiker. What's the date of this telegram?

Senator Baker. This was just before the assassination, two days before the assassination.

Mr. Smothers. Carbines and pistols had been dispatched. Machine guns were in the country but had not been turned over to the dissidents.

Senator Baker. And now, in retrospect, we're not quite sure -- or there's no indication that the guns were actually used in the assassination, although they may have been in the back seat. Is that about the way it stacks up?

The Chairman. And the dissidents had requested machine guns.

Senator Baker. And the witness, or another witness, has said we thought the signals for assassination efforts for machine guns, when in fact it would appear that they went ahead with the material in hand.

Mr. Goodwin. I believe they had additional guns of their own. You wouldn't try it with a .38.

Senator Tower. I think the type of guns is important, because carbines or pistols wouldn't be used in an assassination against a heavily armed --

Mr. Goodwin. Trujillo travelled with bodyguards in a heavily armed car.

Also, if I might add, Senator --

The Chairman. Just to understand what you have said, as the author of this instruction and having conferred about

it and having shown it to President Kennedy, are you testifying that it was your understanding that the meaning of that sentence -- that that sentence was intended to convey to Mr. Dearborn a prohibition against involving the United States in an assassination attempt on the life of Mr. Trujillo?

Mr. Goodwin. Absolutely. And in my first draft, I did it in terms of disclosure and changed that, struck that phrase about disclosure in order to make the point, and always at the President's instruction, to make absolutely clear to the Consul; because I used the very word disclosure, you can see here, and I crossed it out, in my handwriting.

Mr. Schwarz. Could you read into the record how you changed it?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, it's not very grammatical, it's embarrassing. Also, on the xerox -- I can't read the handwriting on the xerox.

"However we also must not" -- something -- "permit any danger of disclosing any U.S. association with political assassination or intervention in the Dominican Republic," it says or intervention. All that was struck.

Senator Baker. That sounds like exactly what the Chairman asked you. It sounds like it might be interpreted as, please don't get caught.

Mr. Goodwin. Absolutely, which is why I changed it, Senator, to read "However, we must not run risks of U.S.

association with political assassination since the U.S., as a matter of general policy, cannot condone assassination."

Senator Baker. I've got to say, and I don't mean it to be critical of this witness, but on first reading of this document, which was some time ago, it sounded a lot to me like the Mission Impossible opening when they say, if you get caught the Secretary will disavow any knowledge of this undertaking.

Mr. Goodwin. I wasn't familiar with the program at this time.

Senator Baker. Nor was I, at that time.

I need reassurance, and I think the record does, that the coincidence of that this cable, this wire, going out, say two days before the assassination, after guns in fact had been dispatched, although not the guns they requested, and under the circumstances it might lend itself to that interpretation.

This witness says it does not. There is no evidence to the contrary that I'm aware of, and I don't know that we need to pursue the issue any further.

Mr. Goodwin. If I may, Senator --

Senator Baker. And it also, as Smothers points out, that there was another communication saying destroy anything you've got, all those communications except this cable.

Mr. Aaron. That is standard practice. That is the standard practice for covert operations.

Mr. Goodwin. My response, Senator, is that the carbines

and pistols were transferred in late January, 1960, subsequent to an authorization of January 12th, prior to Kennedy's taking office. I'm not sure of the date of the transfer. I haven't seen any indication of the date of that transfer. I do know that the President was not aware of any transfer of guns, because he told me he was not aware of it, until we finally requested a review a couple of months, a few months later, of our complete covert operations in the Dominican Republic, at which point we became aware that this transfer had occurred. I still don't know the date of that transfer.

And then it was the basis of that briefing paper, which obviously the Dominican Republic was not the first matter on President Kennedy's agenda when he came into office, on the basis of that briefing paper, he reviewed our policy and sent this telegram.

The Chairman. And was the purpose of the telegram to call off any further involvement by the United States government in an assassination attempt against Mr. Trujillo.

Mr. Goodwin. The purpose was to make sure the United States was not involved in any assassination. The purpose was to slow down that kind of over-zealousness. The President was not that anxious to see Trujillo thrown out.

Senator Tower. That doesn't totally answer the question.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I'm sorry.

The Chairman. Well, you see, we know, from your testimony,

that you had been advised in May that certain weapons had been transferred to certain dissident groups who at least had expressed an interest in assassinating Trujillo.

Mr. Goodwin. Correct.

The Chairman. So there was a connection, the connection being that the American government, through the CIA, furnished weapons to a group that had communicated its interest, if not its intention, to assassinate Trujillo.

So then you send this message, and I'm asking you if the message was meant to call this off, this involvement. What exactly was meant? You weren't saying recover those arms.

Mr. Goodwin. No, I wasn't. No.

The Chairman. But at the same time, you were saying, don't transfer the machine guns, were you not?

Mr. Goodwin. That's right. I think the President -- what we were saying is --

The Chairman. What exactly were you saying?

Mr. Goodwin. We were saying that we didn't want to do anything that would involve us further, the United States further, in any effort to assassinate Trujillo.

The Chairman. I see. I see.

Mr. Goodwin. Because we were not for assassination.

Senator Baker. The distinction is --

Senator Tower. Well, it says here in number 3, it says, continue to inform dissident elements of U.S. support of their

position. So what, again the interpretation that can be drawn from this is that we don't want to be involved, but go ahead and have the other guys on, because their position would be to assassinate Trujillo, so what you are in effect doing is saying, let's don't be involved in it but let's indicate our support for what they are doing.

Mr. Goodwin. We were indicating our support for what they were doing on the basis of the estimate in the contingency paper that Trujillo's days were numbered and whoever took office we wanted to be our man, that is correct. And so we were going to support and try to retain relations and say we would support, which is not a difficult thing to do, as you know, any group that might take office and be moderate and pro-United States. That was all we were interested in, was having a pro-American government.

Senator Schweiker. Well, there are two other references here, Mr. Goodwin. Paragraph 3, "In case of assassination or overthrow" -- obviously you still had a reference there, whether initiated by a pro-U.S. group or not, was still part of the planning, and then back on page 3 you say, "In actual fact, we feel the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and expose the United States to great danger of ultimate disclosure in participation in an assassination attempt," and that is scratched out, and says "assassination attempt," meaning that there was -- to me -- some other plan afoot to assassinate

since the ultimate would still be disclosed if you gave this.

So what interpretation? I mean, this is rift here with assassination propositions, and the fact that you have "ultimate disclosure," fear of ultimate disclosure of participation, meant that certainly there was something already afoot, that ultimately would be disclosed if you went ahead with this pass through.

Mr. Goodwin. I think what we were saying is if we did, it would be found out ultimately, which means not right away, but later. In the case of assassination or overthrow, there were many groups, a continual flow of groups, of information, that there were various groups planning to assassinate Trujillo.

Senator Schweiker. Well, if that's what it meant, then why did you delete it?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I think --

Senator Schweiker. If that was your interpretation, why in fact did you delete those four words, "ultimate disclosure of participation?"

Mr. Goodwin. Could you tell me what page you're reading from?

Senator Schweiker. Page 3.

The very words that you interpret one way were in fact deleted, which shows to me that you meant them another way, or they wouldn't have been deleted, and you substitute two words

for it.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I mean --

Senator Schweiker. So that you disguise that.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, the words were deleted because they were words that were going to give exactly the impression you are talking about. By talking about ultimate disclosure, we were afraid of being found out and what we didn't want was any association with the assassination attempts, so the reference to disclosure was struck and the words association were inserted.

Senator Schweiker. But you still call off -- you still left the language, in actual fact we feel the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and expose the United States to great danger of association with assassination attempts. That still makes the point that you want to make, but you had other language, that says "ultimate disclosure of participation" which implies to me you were concerned about other things you were doing and things that had already been programmed and an operation that you were as much concerned about those being -- or you wouldn't have changed the language to still say the same thing with that one distinction about something else being afoot. I don't --

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I changed it, I believe, Senator -- I mean it's hard to be held responsible for language that was rejected because it was inaccurate. The problem was not one

of disclosure, the problem was we did not want to be associated with assassination. That's why I struck it out.

Senator Schweiker. You changed the language, but the first part of it remained exactly the same. In fact, we feel the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and expose the United States. So while you changed the language, you had the same condition there that you were not going to supply those arms.

Mr. Goodwin. We weren't, that's correct. We were not --

Senator Schweiker. But why were you not concerned about the other language, because --

Mr. Goodwin. Because the implication of the other language was that, well, we were worried about being found out, when in fact what the policy was was that we did not want to be involved. So I struck the implication.

Mr. Smothers. Mr. Goodwin, why was the communication of our withdrawing to Dearborn? The only way Dearborn could have been any closer to this plot would have been to become one of the dissident group. They told him everything they did, down to and including when the car was coming down the road. And we knew that, didn't we?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I haven't seen any communications to us that said that. I would not have -- I mean, one of his instructions was to keep in very close contact with these dissident groups. I wouldn't be surprised if they dropped by

and if they told him everything they were planning to do. But it's a long jump between saying you're going out and kill Trujillo and pulling it off, as many people tried.

But I was not aware, as I can remember, that he had any kind of detailed information.

Mr. Smothers. His messages back to CIA, in fact, convey those details, don't they?

Mr. Goodwin. Not that I saw after this, when these -- none of them that --

Mr. Schwarz. Well, did you know or did you not know that the dissidents intended to use the small arms, carbines and pistols, and other materials they had themselves, but intended to use the weapons we had supplied to assassinate Trujillo in precisely the way he was, in fact, assassinated? Did you know that before you wrote the telegram, or not?

Mr. Goodwin. No, because what I'm responding to is a request that says we can't do it unless we have the machine guns, and that's to be used for the assassination. We are saying, don't give them machine guns.

Later on they said to Dearborn, I mean he did tell me that afterwards, I don't know when they told him, well, we'll do it, whether or not we get the machine guns. I mean, that might also just bravado, or an effort to bluff us into saying, well, you might as well give it to them anyway since they're going to do it. I don't know why anyone would take on

Trujillo with a .38. I wouldn't have thought that, if I thought about it.

President Kennedy went to Paris a week or two later. When the assassination actually occurred, we were all taken by surprise, so that Dearborn had detailed knowledge of when it was going to occur, we didn't. The Vice President -- he called an emergency meeting with the Vice President, a telegram was sent to Paris, and then the assassination ended up getting announced by Pierre Salinger.

But this instruction, the President told me he wanted to make it absolutely clear we're not getting involved in assassinations.

Senator Mondale. Mr. Goodwin, the record shows -- I think you've testified to this -- that toward the end of the Eisenhower Administration, they decided to supply arms to this dissident group and assist in the assassination of Mr. Trujillo. Then, as these documents show, at some point very near to the time that Mr. Trujillo was actually assassinated, a telegram was sent to our Consul saying, we don't want to be associated with this.

Why didn't we also say stop it, tell these people not to proceed further, in light of the fact that they may have thought, because of previous history, that their efforts to assassinate Trujillo had our blessing? In other words, there is still a piece missing, in my opinion, that should have

suggested --

Senator Tower. Well, the next line says, "Continue to inform dissidents of U.S. support for their position."

Senator Mondale. In other words, if I were one of those dissidents and I got that from the United States pursuant to this earlier agreement, I would feel encouraged to believe that I had the support of the United States in killing Trujillo, and that we weren't exactly neutral in that, at least, our government was not really neutral, that it encouraged them.

It is true that they didn't get the machine guns, and it is true, apparently that what you understood was that they wanted the machine guns for assassination and they wanted the other weapons for personal defense, but there was still, it would seem to me, reason for them to believe that they had our support.

Why didn't we say or communicate to them we want you to stop and we don't want this man assassinated, and we want you to know that we will have nothing to do with it?

Why wasn't that final -- I just want to make one more point --

There was a similar telegram sent just before Diem was assassinated -- now these are entirely different matters, and I appreciate that -- but it always seems to me that if we're worried about human life, if we're worried about correcting a policy that may have set a possible assassination in motion,

the way to really disassociate it is to say stop, and that is really what I don't understand.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, let me say, Senator, first of all, that the question of assassination now is paramount in people's minds. There is no doubt that we hoped that Trujillo would be overthrown. Not only was their no doubt, but there was a unanimous vote of the Organization of American States that it be ostracized and sanctions imposed with the hope that it might happen. And that occurred ever before we took office and we were in full agreement with it.

There are papers here which talk about the event of a coup of how you're going to get Trujillo some money to get him out of the country. Assassination was always a possibility, but a coup d'etat, a revolution or a civil war of some kind, a whole range of possibilities. And we did, in fact, believe that Trujillo was going to be overthrown one way or another and not necessarily, or even in paramount in our minds, by assassination because -- in fact, it would seem at that time to be the most difficult thing of all to do. He was heavily guarded and protected, ordinarily. They knew more about it than we did.

And when that happened, which we favored that happened, because we felt that the establishment of a democratic regime in the Dominican Republic was something not only beneficial to the United States and to our policies. I mean, when we're talking about Trujillo he was not -- I mean, about human life,

the man was not only a Fascist, but he was a murderer. He used to have a freezer room in the back of his house where he would take people and show them the bodies of enemies.

But in any event, that's none of our concern, but our real concern was that this was regarded as an inevitability and we wanted to be associated with the new government.

Senator Mondale. I understand, but the argument is made with respect to that last telegram that it was a fig leaf telegram designed to cover our tracks should assassination occur and you argue, and I think persuasively, that you intended much more than that, you intended to make it clear that we were not supporting the assassination, that machine guns were not going to be used.

If that was our intent, and I take it that it was, why we didn't we go one step further and say please communicate to these dissidents who have every reason to believe from past history that we may be supporting the overthrow, including assassination, that we oppose the assassination of Mr. Trujillo.

Wouldn't that make it very clear then that we were out of the business?

Mr. Goodwin. I don't know. It would have made it, I suppose, clearer to them. On the other hand, I think, it's their country, and they could deal with Trujillo as they wanted to. It was not going to be us that dealt with him in this fashion.

Senator Mondale. Yeah, but see, if we were completely neutral I'd agree with that. If they wanted to assassinate Trujillo that's their business. I agree with it, that's none of our business.

But I think we were already implicated. It's sort of like being in a criminal conspiracy and then pulling out the day before the job is done and not telling anybody. It seems to me you should say, boys, I'm out and I don't want you to do it.

The Chairman. I've changed my mind.

Senator Mondale. That's why I don't understand.

Senator Baker. It's sort of like the situation that's been described to us where people were beyond control and you couldn't communicate with them after the forces had been set in motion.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, may I tell you, I don't know that there ever was any statement that those guns that were authorized on January 12th, either in the authorization or subsequent, for the purposes of assassination or otherwise.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, there were scores of those, and whether they reached you or not is a separate and important question, but there are four or five examples of communication to the Agency, and I think passed on to the State Department, and that those guns were to be used for an assassination effort whether or not the machine guns were obtained.

Senator Mondale. Well, you see, that could be important.

because if your understanding was as you have just described then the telegram makes more sense. But if in fact we were implicated, as I understood earlier in assassination attempts --

The Chairman. Fritz, look at the way Dearborn is. I think it's very important to understand this matter, to look at the way Dearborn apparently understood the instruction. He was the one to whom it was given, and he wires back, having received the instruction, the following -- now this is at Tab J, book 2 of 2, the second J.

It says -- first of all, do you have that, Mr. Goodwin?

Mr. Goodwin. Yes, I do.

The Chairman. It says: "One, I believe we can hold pro-United States dissidents, although with some grumbling on the basis set forth." Now you're not likely to hold them if you tell them you're no longer connected with their scheme and Mr. Dearborn had not been instructed to tell them that.

"Two, following our observations for Department and CAS considerations, A) if attempt is made by United States' friends to assassinate Trujillo, there will be accusations against us and the best we can do is see there is no proof."

Senator Baker. To see there is no proof.

The Chairman. "The greatest danger point is Thomas Stockard. He was given a small number of arms by dissident agents to hold several days and has told several persons dissidents obtained these items from Consulate. Stockard told me saying, I have

informed him this cannot be true or I would know and when he requested me supply arms through him for dissidents, I told him it was impossible. He is greater danger because of personal embiterment against CAS, a matter of which CAS headquarters is fully informed."

Then he goes on to say that "since local CAS is now to engage mainly in intelligence collection and reporting, I recommend urgent transfer from the Dominican Republic of three CIA officers. If simmering assassination plot should materizlie they would be in danger and might be picked up for Trujillo-type questioning. This is easily avoidable by quick transfer now. These three have engaged in fully authorized activity which, if uncovered, could put the United States in bad public position. There is still considerable job in counterespionage and the collection and reporting and need to follow GODR, foster Leftist activities."

Now there's a vote on.

I read this because it suggests that Mr. Dearborn got a different message than the one you say you intended to send.

(A brief recess was taken.)

tape 6a

The Chairman. Let's go back on the record.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, that paragraph, to me, Senator, Paragraph A -- I am not sure whether his interpretation of instructions, or at least in specifics, seems to be clear. He says that he has informed them that he cannot supply arms

to the dissidents, and that is what is what Kennedy, of course, had said in the telegram. And the request had been to know whether or not he could supply arms.

So that I see from that point of view, I am not sure, quite clear, in what way he misinterpreted the telegram.

The Chairman. Well, let's go down -- I don't think he has misinterpreted his instructions not to supply more arms. That's clear enough. But if you go down to B -- are you with me now?

Mr. Goodwin. Yes.

The Chairman. "Since local CAS" -- I guess that should be Chief of Station -- "Since local Chief of Station, then" -- and that would be CIA Chief of Station -- "Since local Chief of Station is now to engage mainly in intelligence collection and reporting, I recommend urgent transfer from Dominican Republic of three CIA officers. If simmering assassination plot should materialize" -- now that in itself, if I may digress a moment, suggests that in Dearborn's opinion assassination might be imminent. For he says "If simmering assassination plot should materialize, they would be in danger and might be picked up for Trujillo-type questioning. This is easily avoidable by quick transfer now." -- again the indication of his feeling that an assassination might be imminent, otherwise, why transfer them. "These three have engaged in fully authorized activities which, if uncovered, could put the United States in bad public

position."

Now I would read those words as meaning that Mr. Dearborn anticipated at least the real possibility of assassination attempts in the immediate future and that he was recommending that those CIA officers that had been connected with having supplied weapons should be taken out of the Dominican Republic right away.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I would agree with a good part of that, Senator, although I think that there were assassination plots simmering in the Dominican Republic and now, and of course this in fact took place. And I think he was concerned that the assassination would be unsuccessful, that Trujillo would pick up the Americans and find out not simply about the transfer of guns but the whole range of covert activities that they had been engaged in, torture them and perhaps kill them.

And he thought the safest thing to do, with this thing in the air, was to get them out of the country. There was nothing, I think, in the telegram that was sent to him that denies the possibility that Trujillo might be assassinated or that there might be an attempted assassination, which is the purport of Dearborn's, because if the assassination was successful, there was no need to get the CIA out.

The Chairman. But there is something more, really. If the possibility of assassination was a long continuing thing, always on the mind of Dearborn, why does he respond to this

instruction by saying, get these men out now?

Mr. Goodwin. Well I think obviously these people had relayed to him that they're going to try to make the attempt anyway, with or without the machine guns. He thought the attempt might be abortive, and if so, he thought that all Americans or people that worked for him or with him would be in danger.

The Chairman. Then you would have to agree with me, wouldn't you, that in his opinion, Dearborn's opinion, he had evidence that suggested to him that an assassination attempt was imminent.

Mr. Goodwin. I think that's clear. Yes, I think it was.

The Chairman. And he took this sufficiently serious to recommend getting the three CIA agents out without further delay?

Mr. Goodwin. I think that's right. That's absolutely true, because I think he believed that there was a serious attempt in the offing, as indeed there was, and he was absolutely right and he was doing his job well.

I would like to say, if I might go back, that in terms of the telegram, is that I sat in the office with President Kennedy who instructed me to draft a telegram to say that he wanted nothing to do with political assassinations, which I did, so it's not a matter of interpretation, because he cannot testify to that matter, so it's not a question of reading the text so much as deciding whether or not I'm telling the truth

about that instruction.

Mr. Schwarz. Assuming that you are telling the truth --

Mr. Goodwin. Thank you.

Mr. Schwarz. We have to explore whether something went wrong in the communication process, and I want to put some information in front of you and then see if you can help us explain what, if anything, went wrong.

Would you show him Exhibit 2-A.

Now Exhibit 2-A is a cable dated March 20th from the Agency in the Dominican Republic to the Agency in Washington. And reading in Paragraph 3, it describes the way in which -- it describes a plot.

In Paragraph 4, it says the following: "To do, they need five M-3's or comparable machine guns and 1500 rounds ammunition for personal defense in event fire fight. Will use quiet weapons for basic job." Now the basic job is apparently the assassination.

Now again, were you told -- now, in Exhibit 1, you were told in the briefing on covert action by the CIA that the carbines and the pistols had been passed for personal defense weapons and not to do the basic job, as this telegram indicates.

Mr. Goodwin. That's correct. That's what it says.

Mr. Schwarz. Right. I understand that.

Now, what I am trying to understand is, in telling you that the weapons had been passed for personal defense purposes, do

you think that is consistent, is candid, in light of the fact that the Agency had been told that other weapons were going to be used for the basic job, that is the assassination.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, there are several communications regarding the weapon details of the plan and they are obviously inconsistent.

Mr. Schwarz. They are.

Mr. Goodwin. The telegrams say it, but on the other hand, a carbine or pistol is hardly a quiet weapon. I mean, I would regard that as saying I am going to strangle him. And if you're going to have a fire fight with machine guns, I mean in other words, it seems to me that somebody is interpretting what they say, or they might have had five or six different plans.

The request that came to the White House, finally, was very specific, and this is too, that additional weapons are needed in order to carry out an assassination plot. I mean, however you read this, they do say they need additional weapons to carry off an assassination. And that is what the President at that point had in mind on May 13th, around May 13th, about the original transfer, which was not pursuant to any policy that he had established or any directions that he had given, immediately said, you know, make it clear to Dearborn that we're not getting involved in assassinations. They can do what they want, but we are not going to get involved.

Senator Mondale. In other words, the President was advised by you that there was an assassination plot in which we were implicated and he told you that we don't want any part of it and you are to send a message on his authority saying that, and that is what you thought you had done?

Mr. Goodwin. I would phrase it a little bit differently, Senator, which is to say I would say there were people who wanted to assassinate Trujillo to whom we had given some guns and his response was probably like, you mean some idiot gave them guns? I said, yes. He said -- this is a paraphrase -- you know, if you knew Senator Kennedy, or President Kennedy, I mean, he said, well, let's make it clear. And if you compare my draft with the State Department draft, I was overriding, as they point out, because their draft says, we're trying to get this message through but we're blocked by Mr. Goodwin and have to send his message instead. They would rather blame me, of course, than the President.

It is clear that the stress is changed to make it clear that the President wants nothing to do and cannot condone assassination. It does not say cannot condone being caught at assassination, it says cannot condone assassination. And I did that because he told me to do that.

The Chairman. And you have characterized the Kennedy policy as one of getting the government no further involved because there had been a past involvement? He knew that and

you knew that, to the extent that weapons had been furnished dissident groups who had expressed an interest in assassinating Trujillo. And your intention here in sending this telegram was to convey to Mr. Dearborn that the Kennedy Administration wanted no further involvement in this --

Mr. Goodwin. That's right. We found -- the President found out on May 13th that pursuant to the authorization that preceded his coming into office that a couple of carbines and pistols had been transferred in order to mount a major assault on a government that had lasted for thirty years, and it seemed at that point like a formidable threat to Trujillo.

He wanted to make it absolutely clear when he found out that anybody who wanted to assassinate Trujillo in the Dominican Republic that they were going to do it on their own, the United States would have nothing to do with it and we give out no more weapons and this is why he said we do not want to condone assassination or be associated with it. And that's why I wrote the telegram that I drafted that's in my handwriting.

Senator Tower. Well, may I ask you, then, what you interpretted the meaning of the first sentence in number 3, "Continue to inform dissident elements of U.S. support for their position?"

Mr. Goodwin. They were -- their position was that, what they regarded as that Trujillo should be overthrown and replaced by a moderate government. We supported that position, as did

the other members of the Organization of American States, and we wanted to make it very clear that we did support that position, and we wished them well in their efforts to establish that position and if they did we would recognize their government and send them assistance, which we did.

As a matter of fact, we took much greater efforts to get rid of Ramfes Trujillo in the six months that followed the assassination than anything that preceeded it, including bringing the American fleet practically into the harbor at Cuidad Trujillo at the direction of the Secretary of Defense. Instead of carbines and pistols, we brought in destroyers, aircraft carriers and Marine battalions so that they would know what the consequences might be if they didn't get out when they got out.

If I might make one more point, Senator, if I may, is that the countries of South America are full of guns sent there by the American government to be used to kill thousands of people over the last several decades, and with the lone exception of both revolutionaries from underneath and armies from on top -- of course you're well-acquainted with that -- sent knowing that they would be used to kill people in internal struggles. The only distinction in this case is that Trujillo happened to be the head of State, which is a practical distinction, but you could hardly make a moral one.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question in

that respect?

The Chairman. Well, I am not sure I agree with that, although that is a philosophical argument.

Senator Baker. Are you telling us, Mr. Goodwin, that assassination, not of heads of state, but assassination of lesser figures was a common, ordinary occurrence in South America at the behest of America or with American support?

Mr. Goodwin. No, I am talking about that we supply arms to revolutionary groups or to armed groups which we did in say Bolivia, or sometimes to the government itself, or in Chile we gave assistance of various kinds to dissident groups with the knowledge that our assistance would be used in internal struggles.

I don't have to use the word assassinations.

Senator Baker. But how about for internal struggles, then, as opposed to assassination?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, this is an internal struggle in the Dominican Republic.

The Chairman. I think you recognize the distinction, because it is well-defined in our criminal laws. There is a difference between first degree murder and manslaughter. There is supposed to connote a certain difference in moral connotations, and undertaking deliberate action that is targetted against a particular person with the intention of murdering that person is normally regarded under our criminal

laws as the most reprehensible kind of homicide and therefore definted as murder in the first degree. So there must be some gradation there.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, there are gradations, although I do think that many of the activities against, say, someone like Allende or others are equally targetted in Latin American countries and not just general conflict or the killing of particular -- Mexicans, of course, traditionally go out and shoot down leaders of new guerrilla groups or insurgents, but not necessarily with our guns.

The Chairman. But in any event you're not testifying here to your certain knowledge the United States government participated in an assassination attempt or assisting in an assassination attempt --

Mr. Goodwin. No, I don't have any deep knowledge of that subject, what was the natural end consequence of our acts. In any event, I do want to return to this.

This was -- clearly President Kennedy was much closer to yours.

Mr. Schwarz. After the Trujillo assassination took place, President Kennedy was in Paris and as one of the documents we looked at indicates, there was a meeting at which Vice President Johnson was interested in finding out what had happened and you had a review of this, and discussed in that review that the weapons had been passed, the small arms and the machine guns

hadn't been passed and the assassination occurred.

Now, after that review, were any steps taken to make, as a matter of more general, governmental policy, the policy which is expressed in the telegram you drafted at President Kennedy's instruction?

Mr. Goodwin. Not to my knowledge.

(A brief recess was taken.)

The Chairman. Do you have any more questions?

Mr. Schwarz. I don't have any more questions.

The Chairman. Do you have any other matters that you can tell us about the Trujillo assassination for our enlightenment?

Mr. Goodwin. On the assassination?

The Chairman. On the assassination.

Mr. Goodwin. I don't think so, but let me read through all of this, and when I come back the next time, I might have something else, if I can find anything else in there -- I do think this is pretty complete.

The Chairman. We will expect to hear you again early next week, on the Cuban phase of your testimony.

Mr. Goodwin. And Duvallier.

The Chairman. Mr. Dennin, they've been up all night, would like to ask two questions.

Mr. Dennin. Well, when you said there were no more questions, I just raised the possibility and you discussed it

about meetings held after the assassination back in Washington when Mr. Dearborn came back as well as those meetings held after the assassination before he came back, at which the whole matter was discussed, initially with Vice President Johnson presiding and ultimately, the last one, with President Kennedy.

Mr. Goodwin. That's right. We had, of course, a series of emergencies. We had an emergency meeting, and cabled the President who was in Paris, and the first matter on our mind was how to keep Ramfes Trujillo, who was the son of Trujillo, from taking over, and we didn't know where he was, at first, it took us awhile to find out that he was in Paris, which at least indicated, Senator, that if they were planning it, it wasn't done in a very comprehensive fashion, and we found he was in Paris and we wanted to stop him from returning, to detain him, but it was too late. By the time we found out, he had already chartered an Air France jet and was on his way to Cuidad Trujillo, and I believe there was some effort made to bluff him off by sending messages to the plane in flight, diverting it to some American airport, but he didn't do that. and he landed and took over. And I think the principal aim of our policy from that point on was how to get him and his uncle, Hector -- and I forget the other fellow's name -- out of there so that the kind of moderate government that we wanted could be installed.

And John Martin was sent down to talk to him and to make various inducements like he could take his money out, it was discussed that if he would leave peaceably, but what finally happened was when McNamara moved the fleet in over the horizon and an Air Force General bombed the palace, that was the end, he got on his boat and left.

The Chairman. Air Force General?

Mr. Goodwin. A Dominican Air Force General.

He decided that was an easier target than the American fleet.

The Chairman. Was the bombing done at our instruction?

Mr. Goodwin. No, I don't believe so. I was trying to remember that, but I don't believe it was. As I remember, it was quite a surprise to us that this fellow had taken the initiative. The moving of the fleet was intended as sort of a threat that if they didn't get out we might come in and get them. There was no, however, no, at that point, no country attempted to do that, just to scare them. And the fleet was actually cheered in the Dominican Republic, a very rare occasion.

But this Air Force General did, and then he tried to make himself dictator and two of his own officers arrested him. They all had been trained in American military schools.

Mr. Schwarz. To complete the record on the response to the telegram We had Dearborn's reaction. We will read into

the record the cable back from the CIA Chief of Station in response to the telegram Mr. Goodwin drafted.

Assume -- reference B, that's the telegram. "Final word on present policy in which KUBARK" -- that's CIA -- "work here must be based. Para 2 and Para 5, that reference, are for practical purposes retreat from previous policy. However, Headquarters aware extent to which ODYOKE" that is, the United States --"already associated with EMSLEW -- that is the assassination of Trujillo. -- "if we are to at least try 'cover up tracks' KUBARK personnel directly involved in EMSLEW preparations must be withdrawn now."

I don't know if that merits comment or not. It just happens to be how it was interpretted by CIA.

Mr. Goodwin. I think it's accurate and it also reflects Dearborn's own disappointment that --

Mr. Schwarz. CIA.

Mr. Goodwin. CIA's disappointment, which is understandable.

The Chairman. Any further questions?

Senator Tower?

Mr. Smothers?

Mr. Smothers. Mr. Chairman, I'd rather wait till the return of the witness.

The Chairman. Yes.

Let's make certain that Mr. Goodwin has an opportunity to meet with the staff so that the pertinent documents that will

up in connection with our interrogation on Castro will be reviewed. We're not interested in any kind of entrapment. We want you to be fully aware of whatever documentation we have so you can help enlighten us of your understanding of the policy at the time.

Mr. Goodwin. And whatever I bring I can give to you and then duplicate it.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, shall we plan, for safety, on the staff seeing you on Wednesday morning and having your testimony Wednesday afternoon, or could you be here by Tuesday?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, since I'm going to Rumford, Maine and getting the things out, I think it will be safer Wednesday, if that's not too inconvenient.

The Chairman. Wednesday?

All right. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 6:35 o'clock p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 8:30 o'clock a.m., Friday, July 11, 1975.)

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